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Abstract  
This essay explores the extent to which Thailand’s secular legal system reinforces the 
imagined divide, common in Thai Buddhist conceptions of society, between a 
“worldly” sphere and the “religious” sphere of the sangha (order of monks). It asks: 
How far does secular Thai law exclude clergy from the “unmonkly” domains of 
politics and commerce? It shows that there is a striking discrepancy between the 
systematic way in which secular Thai law has kept monks from formally 
participating in “politics” and the rather more permissive way in which it has 
facilitated participation by the monkhood in the sphere of “commerce.” The essay 
concludes with some reflections on this finding and the questions it raises. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
When discussing the relationship between religion and politics in Thailand, a distinction is often 
made between anachak, or the worldly sphere, and satsanachak, or the “religious” sphere of the 
Buddhist monkhood.
1
 Much of mainstream Thai Buddhist thought centres on this dichotomy, 
and assigns to social actors – from kings to commoners, and from supreme patriarchs to 
laypersons – the duty to act in such ways that the boundaries that separate these two spheres are 
reinforced. It follows that state-made law can play an important role in producing and 
reproducing the line of difference between anachak and satsanachak, and this article describes 
and analyses some of the more striking ways in which Thai secular law serves that function – or 
fails to do so. It focuses in particular on one task perceived as central to this endeavour, namely 
to ensure that the country’s Buddhist monks and novices are “kept in their place” – confined to 
the religious sphere and prevented from trespassing into the worldly sphere, dominated as it is by 
greed and immorality. 
For the purposes of this article, it is useful to further sub-divide the worldly sphere into a 
domain of politics and a domain of commerce. “Politics” is here understood as concerned with 
the acquisition of power within formal political institutions, and “commerce” with the 
acquisition and accumulation of material wealth. Buddhist doctrine and the vinaya (the 
regulatory framework for the sangha) are widely interpreted, by monks and laypeople alike, as 
proscribing Thai monks from engaging in political and commercial activities. It is for this reason 
that Buddhist monks who “stray” into the political and commercial arenas are often seen as 
threatening to undermine the sangha’s claim to an elevated social status worthy of popular 
reverence. Given that the Thai state has positioned itself as the foremost patron and protector of 
Thai institutional Buddhism, the precise nature of the relationship between secular law and the 
state’s moral purpose, defined in Buddhist terms, becomes an interesting question. To what 
extent and in what ways does secular law reinforce the imagined boundary between anachak and 
satsanachak? Or in more concrete terms: How does secular law prevent Buddhist clergy from 
engaging in “inappropriately” political and commercial activities?  
This essay will seek to address that question in two steps. I begin by surveying the ways in 
which Thai secular law raises obstacles to Buddhist monks entering the domain of politics.  I 
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then survey the field of law relating to commerce with the same purpose in mind.
2
 The evidence 
I present is not limited to laws that are or once were on the books. It also includes recent 
legislative initiatives that have yet to even reach the legislature. The debates surrounding these 
proposals reveal where currently existing state law is thought (by some) to fall short with regards 
to the regulation of the Buddhist monastic community. A comparison of these two areas of Thai 
state law reveals that Buddhist monks face formidable legal barriers excluding them from the 
political sphere but not from the commercial sphere. Most notably, Thai constitutions, election 
laws, and political party laws have systematically excluded Buddhist monks from formal 
political participation. Monks cannot vote, stand for election, serve in elected offices, or be 
founders or members of political parties. In contrast, Thai commercial law has made few 
exceptions for Buddhist monks, thus providing a secular legal framework that more readily 
enables them to enter into the commercial sphere. I conclude with some reflections on this 
striking discrepancy and the questions it raises. 
 
II. Law, Politics, and the Monkhood 
 
In Thailand, the widely perceived desirability of preventing Buddhist clergy from entering the 
political arena has been reflected in a succession of laws that regulate formal political 
participation by defining who can and who cannot participate in elections, whether as voters or 
candidates. It has also been reflected in judicial rulings and political sensibilities that seek to 
create an appearance of separation between two entities that by all accounts are so closely 
intertwined as to be virtually inseparable: the state bureaucracy and the Sangha.
3
 
One very noteworthy aspect of the relationship between religion and politics in Thailand is 
that Thai law makes a “Buddhist exception” to the principle of universal suffrage.4 This means 
that Buddhist monks (as well as female ascetics, such as mae chi) are barred from voting in 
elections to political office.
5
 The historical origin of this ban is to be found in a Siamese law on 
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local government administration (first enacted in 1897), that in 1914 was amended to ensure that 
only kharawat (laypersons) were eligible to vote in elections for the position of village headman. 
This precedent was followed when elections for national representative offices were introduced 
following the end of the absolute monarchy. Thus, Siam’s first Parliamentary Election Act, 
promulgated in December 1932, stipulated that persons who on the day of the election had the 
status of phiksu samanen nakphrot rue nakbuat (monk, novice, hermit, or clergyperson) would 
be ineligible to vote. This provision was incorporated into the Thai constitution of 1949, and it 
has retained that elevated position since then, in spite of the fact that the Thai political system 
has evinced an extraordinarily high constitutional churn rate.
6
  
Similar restrictions apply to local elections as well. The act on elections to sapha tambon 
(district councils), first enacted in 1939, and since amended a number of times, makes clear that 
monks, novices, etc, are ineligible from voting and standing for election. 
Given that Buddhist clergy (and mae chi) are barred from voting, it is perhaps not surprising 
that they are similarly barred from standing for election to political offices, or that they are 
banned from forming and even joining political parties. The Political Parties Act of 1955 made 
clear that only eligible voters may form political parties (thus excluding clergy), but was silent 
on the question of clergy becoming members of political parties. Subsequent versions of the law 
(1968, 1974, 1981, 1998, 2007) removed such ambiguity by clearly stipulating that Buddhist 
clergy and mae chi can neither form nor join political parties.  
Thus, once opportunities for widespread popular political participation were introduced into 
the Thai political system, secular Thai law, which regulates such participation, has reflected an 
abiding concern with ensuring that Buddhist renunciants, both male and female, are formally 
barred from participating in the regularized competition for political power. In this way, Thai 
secular law has reinforced the social boundary separating anachak (where politics is played) 
from satsanachak (where it is not). 
Because they reflect strong norms in Thai society, laws excluding Buddhist monks and mae 
chi from the political sphere are mostly self-enforcing, and Thai authorities only rarely have to 
take action in this regard. But it has happened that the norm has been challenged. In recent 
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elections, for example, mae chi have shown up at polling stations, where election officials have 
denied them the right to vote since they regard them as belonging to the category nakbuat 
(clergypersons).
7
 The courts have also weighed in. In 1989 the Supreme Court of Thailand ruled 
that Mr. Samran Rodyaem who a few years earlier had been elected to the district council in Tha 
Reua District, Ayutthaya Province, had indeed forfeited his position as councillor the moment he 
entered the monkhood, even though his ordination was only temporary.
8
 
The law does not, of course, exclude monks from every form of political participation. As is 
well-known, Buddhist monks frequently sacralise state ceremonies, speak out on political issues, 
bless politicians on the campaign trail, join mass demonstrations, etc. While some of these 
activities may go against the expressed wishes of the Sangha hierarchy, they do not in and of 
themselves contravene any secular laws. 
The concern with ensuring a separation between anachak and satsanachak also manifests in a 
concern with policing the boundary separating the secular bureaucracy – which is vested with 
political authority – and the Sangha hierarchy. This became particularly relevant following the 
establishment in 1997 of a system of Administrative Courts that would settle disputes between 
different state agencies or between organs of the state and citizens. Should the new court’s 
jurisdiction encompass also the Sangha? This question has been addressed in a number of recent 
lawsuits. In 2002, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled on two cases where an ex-monk in 
Sisaket claimed the abbot of his temple and the district head of the Sangha had incorrectly 
ordered him by to leave the monkhood and to stop all religious involvement with laypersons. The 
Supreme Administrative Court argued that it did not have jurisdiction in this case, as the dispute 
did not arise because of decisions taken by “state officials,” but rather by the Sangha hierarchy in 
accordance with the Sangha Act.
9
 Two years later, the Supreme Administrative Court’s 
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interpretation was challenged by a supporter of the Buddhist reform movement Santi Asoke, who 
claimed that the 1989 order by the Sangha Supreme Council (SSC) which defrocked Pothirak, 
the group’s charismatic leader, was invalid. The appellant insisted that the dispute did fall within 
the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction, because, he asserted, the SSC is a state organisation. In 
support of this claim, he argued that the SSC chairman is under the Prime Minister’s authority; 
that the SSC had been constituted through political and legal processes; that the government 
funds the SSC; and, finally, that the power and authority exercised by the SSC is derived from 
the 1962 Sangha Act. The Supreme Administrative Court disagreed. In its decision, the court did 
not, however, refute or even address the argument that the SSC is a state organisation. It merely 
noted that the Sangha Act assigns the role of governing the monastic community to the SSC – 
and it insisted that this means that the court does not have jurisdiction over disputes within the 
Sangha.
10
 Thus, while individuals dissatisfied with administrative actions by the Sangha 
hierarchy have sought to “judicialize” their disputes, the Thai judiciary has systematically 
refused such invitations.
11
 In doing so it has produced and reproduced the fundamental 
conceptual divide within the Thai polity between anachak and satsanachak. Thus, whereas state 
bureaucrats can be held accountable for administrative acts through appeals to the Administrative 
Court system – ecclesiastic bureaucrats cannot. 
Similar concerns about keeping clear lines of separation between the secular bureaucracy and 
the Sangha have surfaced during debates concerning a recent legislative initiative. Over the past 
decade or so, there has been a concerted effort to enact a law for the “patronage and protection of 
Buddhism.”12 A flurry of efforts in this direction has produced a number of different drafts of the 
law, authored by different groups and containing correspondingly divergent substantive 
provisions. In 2007, there were at least four different versions of the draft, produced, 
respectively, by the National Office of Buddhism (NOB); members of the national legislature; 
the religion and culture committee of the House of Representatives; and a sub-committee in the 
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senate.
13
 This is not the place to dissect all these different proposals. I should like to highlight 
only that one of these versions got as far through the legislative process that it received scrutiny 
by the Council of State, which advises the executive branch of government on legal matters. The 
proposed law would create a Committee for the Patronage and Protection of Buddhism with 
extensive executive functions (for example to appoint and remove NOB officials). Senior monks 
would, furthermore, serve on this committee, alongside representatives of secular state power. To 
this the Council of State objected. Having monks serve as members of the committee was, it 
noted, “perhaps not appropriate” given that the Committee’s remit went beyond “ecclesiastical 
affairs” (kit khong song). Furthermore, membership of a state committee with executive 
functions would expose clergy to the risk of being taken to court on account of the committee’s 
decisions, as provided for in secular law (for example, for unfair dismissal).
14
 Thus, it would no 
longer be possible to shield the Sangha hierarchs from the jurisdiction of the administrative 
courts. 
In the wake of the 2014 military coup there was a renewed effort to enact a law for the 
“patronage and protection of Buddhism,” and the ruling junta and the SSC (with one objection) 
gave their approval in principle to a new draft.
15
 Like earlier versions, the junta-backed draft set 
out to create a new bureaucratic structure to oversee the state’s role as promoter and protector of 
Buddhism. At the top of the hierarchy would be a Committee for the Patronage and Protection of 
Buddhism, to be chaired by the Prime Minister, and including three representatives of the SSC 
(all of whom are senior monks), the rectors of the country’s two Buddhist universities (who are 
also senior monks), the permanent secretaries of seven different ministries, the attorney general, 
the national chief of police, and the director-general of the Department of Public Relations. In 
addition, the committee would be comprised of four experts with knowledge of Buddhism, 
appointed by the prime minister, and four representatives of Buddhist organizations. This 
national committee would be replicated at the provincial level, with every province having a 
Provincial Committee for the Patronage and Protection of Buddhism, to be chaired by the 
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provincial governor and in other respects closely mirroring the make-up of the national 
committee. These committees, whether national or provincial, would mix representatives of both 
the secular and the religious arms of the Buddhist bureaucracy. However, the committees would 
have no independent executive authority. Their responsibility would be merely to formulate 
policy proposals and guidelines for the patronage and protection of Buddhism. The junta-backed 
version of the law thus avoided vesting senior Buddhist clergy with secular political power by 
turning the national and provincial committees into non-executive bodies. This goes some way 
toward maintaining the appearance that clergy are not directly engaged in “politics.” 
What this discussion reveals is that Thai secular law reflects an abiding concern with keeping 
monks “in their place” which in this case means outside areas of activity that are conceived of as 
“political” in a formal sense. Such concerns are reflected in the ways in which laws regulating 
popular political participation have been written and the ways in which laws regulating the state 
bureaucracy have been interpreted. 
 
III. Law, Commerce, and the Monkhood 
 
While Thai secular law systematically circumscribes the ability of members of the sangha from 
directly exercising and gaining secular political power, the same cannot be said with regards to 
monastic accumulation of (private) wealth and the exercise of economic power.  
Most notably, the Civil and Commercial Code (CCC) has defined temples (wat-wa-aram) as 
juristic persons that can own different categories of property. According to the 1962 Sangha Act, 
the overall responsibility for the management of temple assets rests with the abbot. Temple 
lands, one of the most important types of financial assets, are divided into three different kinds: 
land on which a temple is located (thi wat); land outside temple compounds that is owned by 
temples (thi thoranisong); and land over which temples enjoy usufruct rights (thi kalapana). 
While the landed assets of temples are thus recognised as having a special status, separate from 
“ordinary” land, land is of course a commodity with considerable commercial value, and persons 
in authority may exploit this for private gain. While abbots are not “supposed” to handle money 
and finance personally (according to the vinaya), and could rely on the aid of laypersons for this, 
  9 
they very often take direct charge of temple finances, with very little accountability and 
transparency.
16
 
In the same way that Thai constitutions and electoral laws define who is or is not allowed to 
participate in political processes, the CCC also defines who is to be regarded as competent with 
regards to entering commercial contracts. Both sets of law exclude children and youth as well as 
the mentally impaired from full formal participation in political and commercial affairs. The 
CCC also puts limits on the ability of married women to independently enter into commercial 
transactions, without the formal approval of their husband. Unlike laws regulating political 
participation, however, the CCC does not impose any restrictions on Buddhist clergy from 
entering the world of commerce. When the CCC was expanded to include a section on 
inheritance in 1935, it stipulated that property that a Buddhist monk (phiksu) has accumulated 
while wearing the yellow robe on his death becomes the property of the temple in which he 
resides, except if he has already transferred or willed it to someone else (Section 1623). Thus, 
when the head of the Thai Sangha, Prince-Patriarch Jinavarasirivadhana, passed away two years 
later, he left “a will containing bequests to his disciples and family members.”17 Rather than 
constraining the ability of Buddhist clergy to enter into the worldly sphere, then, the CCC 
arguably facilitates commercial engagement by Buddhist monks, even though this might be 
regarded as contrary to the spirit of the vinaya, which precludes private wealth accumulation by 
monks (as the rules ban them from accepting or using money, and exchanging property). 
The right of monks to write wills and to transfer property acquired while in the yellow robe 
was first included in the CCC in 1935, but the practice appears to have been introduced some 
three decades earlier, in the first years of the 20
th
 century. The French legal scholar Robert 
Lingat writes that when Thai lawmakers introduced the right to testament property, it was not 
limited to laypersons, and members of the monkhood thus became able to will their property to 
laypersons. According to Lingat, this provided a new means by which to privatize property, 
including pious donations, which otherwise, by default, would have become the property of the 
“church” (i.e., the Sangha). Lingat observes that the Siamese clergy did not protest this secular 
legal innovation that ran counter to established Buddhist doctrine and tradition; on the contrary, 
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they appeared to be satisfied with it.
18
 Given Lingat’s silence on the matter, it seems likely that 
pious lay Buddhists also accepted the new rules without opposition. 
While the right for monks to transfer and will property they acquire while wearing the yellow 
robes may not have been much of a political issue when first introduced, it has certainly become 
one today. Critics argue that this “loophole” in Thailand’s commercial law facilitates a pattern of 
monastic behaviour that is inappropriately orientated toward the accumulation of wealth. Wat 
Phra Dhammakaya, a controversial new religious movement (or sect), is something of a pioneer 
of this new type of Buddhism.
19
 A slew of recent scandals have revealed how members of the 
monkhood amass huge private fortunes, not least through participation in phuttha phanit 
(Buddha-commerce). A prominent case in point is the “jet-setting” monk known as Neen Kham, 
who had accumulated a considerable fortune by soliciting donations for various religious 
projects. In response to the scandal, which included allegations of a number of other activities 
unbecoming of a monk, the Anti-Money Laundering Office seized assets belonging to Neen 
Kham and his associates.
20
 
The moral panic triggered by such revelations about financially misbehaving monks has 
prompted calls for reforms to ensure that the boundary separating a commercialized anachak 
from a non-commercial satsanachak is more clearly defined and better policed. Reacting to the 
apparent inability of the Buddhist establishment to stem the startling growth of phuttha phanit in 
modern Thai society, the search is on for ways of mobilizing secular state power against 
religious practices and teachings that are perceived to be undesirable because of their 
commercial orientation. Following the most recent military coup, a number of such initiatives 
have been taken, thus illuminating how the Thai political system is seeking to formulate 
legislative remedies to Buddhism’s perceived crisis. Here I will discuss two of these. 
First, a recent report by a “Committee for Reform of Guidelines and Measures for the 
Protection of Buddhist Affairs” (on which no monks served) outlined some of the ways in which 
Thai secular law might be employed in the service of this religious purpose.
21
 The report 
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identified loopholes in the CCC and weaknesses in the management of the financial affairs of 
temples as areas needing urgent reform. Subsequent to the release of the report – which proved 
highly unpopular among segments of the sangha, who accused members of the committee of 
being religious and political extremists
22
 – the committee has proceeded to draft laws that it 
believed would go some way to ensure “proper” behaviour by Buddhist clergy. One of these 
would amend the CCC so that it no longer recognized the right of monks to will and transfer 
property acquired while in the monkhood. It would do so by simply deleting sections 1622, 1623, 
and 1624 of the CCC. Another law drafted by the committee would turn temples, which are 
recognized as juristic persons, into foundations (munithi). Foundations are at least in theory 
members of a particularly well-regulated category of juristic person. Transforming temples into 
tax-exempt foundations would take effective financial power out of the hands of individual 
abbots, placing it in the hands of properly constituted management committees, who would be 
required to submit their accounts to the Revenue Department annually in order to keep their tax-
exempt status, thus greatly increasing financial transparency and accountability.
23
 
Second, the draft law for the “patronage and protection of Buddhism,” which, as noted in the 
previous section, was given a tentative stamp of approval by the military junta not only contained 
proposals for the creation of a new series of committees. It also sought to criminalize a wide 
range of transgressions, by monks, of the vinaya and of SSC regulations and directives. These 
included (but were not limited to) a number of “deviant” behaviours that relate, directly or 
indirectly, to the commercialization of Buddhism and monastic engagement in moneymaking 
pursuits: deviation from the Tripitaka (specifically aimed at the teachings of Wat Phra 
Dhammakaya); inappropriate commerce involving Buddhist symbols, amulets, etc; and 
gambling. Poor management of the sangha would also become a criminal offense. Thus, monks 
in positions of authority would risk punishment if they were lax in their governance of the 
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monkhood, such that their acts of commission or omission “cause damage to Buddhism” (koet 
khwam siahai kae phraphutthasatsana). That would open up the possibility of senior Sangha 
hierarchs being charged with a criminal offence, should they allow financial improprieties to 
occur on their watch. 
If this version of the law had been enacted, breaking the vinaya would become a criminal 
offense – and Thailand essentially a theocratic state.24 After scrutiny by the Council of State, 
however, the entire section on criminalization of transgressions of monastic law and regulations 
was removed from the draft, probably for the purpose of jurisprudential neatness. As the Council 
of State had noted in a comment on an earlier but similar draft, criminal punishments should be 
defined in the Penal Code. Thus, if there now were a need to protect Buddhism in new ways, 
then it would be the Penal Code that needed to be updated accordingly.
25
 This argument does 
seem somewhat incongruous, however, as the 1962 Sangha Act already defines some criminal 
offences and their associated punishments.
26
 
One additional aspect of the initial junta version of the draft law is also of relevance to the 
issue of keeping monks out of the commercial sphere. The draft sought to establish a Fund for 
the Patronage and Protection of Buddhism. The Fund would be run by a Management Committee 
chaired by a deputy prime minister, representatives of a number of relevant ministries and 
departments, and a number of independent experts. Clergy would not serve directly on the 
management committee, but the SSC would nominate three monks to serve as “advisors.”27 This 
arrangement appears designed to shield clergy from being accused of having entered the spheres 
of “politics” and “commerce.”  
One striking aspect of the many recent proposals for reform of the sangha's financial 
management practices is that they echo the rhetoric about “good governance” that became 
popular in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, which began in Thailand on 2 June 1997. In the 
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quest for improved accounting and financial reporting standards, these proposals essentially 
recycle the “good governance” rhetoric and apply them to a new domain: satsanachak. While the 
concept of good governance had been localized in Buddhist terms and translated as 
thammaphiban,
28
 the principles of best practices of good governance have not (yet) been applied 
to the Buddhist monkhood itself. The proposed reforms would change that. Whether this most 
archaic of Thai social institutions will allow itself to be subjected to such administrative and 
financial rationalization and modernization remains to be seen. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
From the discussion above it seems clear that secular law in Thailand does not, on the whole, 
reflect the same kind of concern with keeping monks “in their place” when it comes to 
commerce as it does with regards to “politics.” This prompts two main questions. 
First, why is it that Thai secular law has taken a more permissive approach to the mixing of 
monks and “commerce” than to monks and “politics”? This is not a question that can be 
answered here, but a few initial observations are in order. In historical and regional perspective, 
it is really no puzzle at all as to why monks are not allowed to participate in formal politics in 
Thailand. When electoral politics was introduced in neighbouring and similarly Theravada 
Buddhist societies – post-independence Burma, Laos, and Cambodia – monks were also 
disenfranchised. Thus, Siam conforms to what would at the time have been conventional 
political wisdom throughout much of Theravada Buddhist Southeast Asia.
29
 So the real question 
is what might have motivated Thai lawmakers to formulate laws pertaining to wealth and 
commerce without making much of a distinction between monks and laypersons. I find it 
particularly curious that commercial law allows Thai monks to transfer and will property 
acquired while in the monkhood.
30
 This is puzzling not only because it would seem to run 
counter to both Buddhist doctrine and the institutional interests of the Thai Sangha. It is puzzling 
also in light of comparison: In colonial Burma, neither monks nor laypersons could distribute 
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their property through the use of testaments; nor can they do so in contemporary Myanmar. 
Future research into the historical and political origins of such striking differences – within and 
between Buddhist societies – in how secular law regulates the monkhood in relation to politics 
and commerce may thus have much to gain from adopting an explicitly comparative approach. 
Was there ever a similar level of regional “Buddhist consensus” on how the state should regulate 
temple finances, sangha assets, and the (private?) property of monks, as emerged around the 
inappropriateness of allowing monks to participate in politics like ordinary citizens? 
Second, is the status quo in Thailand, with its striking inconsistency, sustainable? There are 
two different ways in which secular Thai law governing monastic behaviour relating to the two 
dimensions of anachak could possibly become more consistent. One is for monks to be given as 
ready access to the political sphere as they are to the commercial sphere. This is a model 
pioneered by Sri Lanka, where there are few legal barriers that prevent monks from entering the 
spheres of politics and commerce.
31
 The other way is for access to the commercial sphere to 
become as restricted as it is for the political sphere. There is considerable public debate and 
political mobilization in Thailand that concerns which of these options would be most beneficial 
for society. 
On the one hand, segments of the Thai middle classes express high levels of concern over the 
commodification and commercialization of religion – processes which according to the late Thai 
anthropologist Pattana Kitiarsa have turned Thai Buddhism into a “prosperity religion.”32 The 
perceived inability of Buddhist doctrine and the vinaya to prevent the introduction of capitalist 
logics of accumulation into Buddhist institutions (such as temples) and their embrace by 
prominent religious personalities has prompted a search for “solutions” in secular law. Such 
impulses find political expression in the recent efforts, launched by the ruling military junta, to 
reform Thai Buddhism. The proposals that have been put forward by the junta-appointed 
reformers of religion would, if enacted and enforced, provide the state and the ecclesiastic 
hierarchy with an expanded range of secular legal instruments by which to ensure that members 
of the monastic community do not stray into the commercial sphere. 
                                                 
31
 In Sri Lanka, Buddhist monks may vote, establish political parties, stand as candidates in elections for political 
office, and become members of parliament. 
32
 Kitiarsa (2007). 
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On the other hand, some Thai intellectuals are proposing that the state should get out of the 
business of defining the “proper” place of Buddhist monks, or at least reduce its involvement in 
that regard to a significant degree. Thus, it has been argued that Thai clergy should be given the 
right to vote,
33
 and even that there is no valid reason for Thai secular law to treat monks 
separately from ordinary citizens in any way.
34
 Such liberal sentiments tend to be spring from 
concern with the state of Thai democracy as much as with the state of Thai Buddhism. But it is 
not necessarily only persons of identifiably “secular” persuasions who suggest that separating 
“church” and state might be beneficial for Thai society. The prominent scholar-monk Phra 
Phaisan Visalo, for example, has argued that Buddhism in Thailand is experiencing a crisis in 
large part because of an overly rigid concern with keeping the worldly sphere and the monkhood 
separate, and because of the sangha’s excessive dependence upon the state.35 
The legal provisions and the debates surrounding them that have been the focus of this essay 
may seem somewhat frivolous, directly affecting as they do but a small minority of the Thai 
population,
36
 and taking place at a time when the country has been suffering from destructive 
political turmoil and seen a return to repressive military rule. But even in this troubled political 
context there are, arguably, few matters more serious than how to define the role of the Thai state 
in relation to Buddhism, and thus the moral purpose of the law.  
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